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NEWMAN K. GILES, 
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Defendants-Respondents. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
Appeal from the Idaho Industrial Commission 
State of Idaho, Thomas P. Baskin, Chairman, Presiding 
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Residing at Idaho Falls, ID for Appellant, Newman K. Giles 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is a worker's compensation case appealed from the Idaho Industrial Commission 
(hereinafter the "Commission"). Appellant Newman "Kal" Giles (hereinafter "Giles" or 
"claimant") appeals the Order of the Commission dated August 27, 2013, adopting the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Referee finding that the defendants, Eagle Farms, Inc. and 
Idaho State Insurance Fund, met their burden of establishing that the claimant's intoxication was 
a reasonable and substantial cause of his injuries such that he is barred from receiving income 
benefits pursuant to Idaho Code §72-208. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On June 15, 2009 claimant filed a Complaint alleging entitlement to medical and income 
benefits arising out of an automobile accident which he claims occurred while in the employ of 
Eagle Farms, Inc. (hereinafter "Employer" or "Eagle Farms"). R., pp. 1-4. In their Answer, 
defendants denied that any income benefits were owed to the claimant, but admitted that they 
owed continuing reasonable and necessary medical benefits beyond the defendants' current 
payment of $153.430.54 in medical benefits. R., pp. 5-6. Defendants also asserted as an 
affirmative defense that the claimant's intoxication was a reasonable and substantial cause of his 
injuries thus barring him from income benefits pursuant to Idaho Code §72-208. R., p. 7. 
Pursuant to a stipulation between the parties to bifurcate the issues, the Commission held a 
hearing on June 12, 2012 on the sole issue of whether claimant was precluded from recovering 
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income benefits pursuant to Idaho Code §72-208. R., pp. 11-13. On August 16, 2013 the 
Referee concluded that the defendants met their burden of proving that the claimant's 
intoxication was a reasonable and substantial cause of his injuries thus barring him from 
receiving income benefits pursuant to Idaho Code §72-208. R., p. 28. The Commission then 
issued an Order on August 27, 2013 adopting the Referee's findings of fact and conclusions of 
law and ordering that claimant is barred from receiving income benefits pursuant to Idaho Code 
§72-208. R., pp. 30-31. Claimant timely appealed. 
C. Statement of the Facts 
At the time of the hearing the claimant was twenty three years old. Tr., p. 31, L. 23. At 
the time of his motor vehicle accident in August 2008, the claimant was eighteen years old. Id. 
at Ll. 24-25. The claimant admitted that prior to his accident he liked to drive fast. Tr., p. 32, Ll. 
18-21. In fact, at one point he was stopped for speeding over 100 mph while in Arizona. Tr., p. 
38, Ll. 10-14. However, the claimant testified that although he was a huge speeder, he always 
felt that he could handle driving speeds of upwards of 100 mph. Defendants' Ex. 6, 
Claimant's Deposition dated July 22,2010 ("Claimant depo.") p. 20, Ll. 7-14; Tr., p. 33, Ll. 14-
23. Despite his propensity to speed, the claimant's accident which is the subject of his workers' 
compensation claim in August 2008 was his first motor vehicle accident. Tr., p. 35, Ll. 2-4. 
1. August 17,2008 Motor Vehicle Accident 
In the early morning hours of August 17, 2008, at approximately 3:30 a.m., claimant was 
involved in motor vehicle accident while operating a grey 2002 GMC pickup traveling south on 
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Old Bassett Highway when he failed to negotiate a right hand curve as he neared 3145 East and 
ran off the east side of the highway. Claimant's Ex. 1, p. 2. At the time of the accident the 
claimant was driving his brother's truck which had been doubled chipped to provide more 
horsepower and speed. Tr., p. 37, Ll. 5-22. The claimant testified that he was driving after he 
had worked on a faulty pivot sprinkler at a farm in Terreton. Tr., p. 43, 6-15; p. 52, Ll. 9-15. 
His father, Newman Giles, clarified that the location of the accident was 30 miles south of the 
Terreton farm on the road returning to his house or the farm office. Tr., p. 105, LL. 3-17. While 
the exact time of the accident is unknown, according to City of Idaho Falls ambulance service 
records, dispatch was notified of the accident at approximately 3:39 a.m. Defendant's Ex. 1, p. 
2. The ambulance arrived on the scene at 3:51 a.m. Id. 
Claimant was found by paramedics ejected from his vehicle laying 20 yards from the 
road in the middle of a brush field. Defendant's Ex. 1, p. 2. At 3:53 a.m., the paramedics 
immobilized claimant's spine and administered oxygen. Id. He was then transported by 
ambulance to the hospital where he arrived at 4: 17 a.m. Id. According to a blood test taken at 
the hospital at 4:28 a.m., the claimant's alcohol serum was .123. Defendants' Ex 2, p. 34. 
At approximately 4:06 a.m., Corporal Allen Bivens, an Idaho State Trooper, was called 
out to the scene by his command center. Tr., p. 57, Ll. 2-7. He was advised that the injuries 
suffered by claimant were serious enough to be lite-threatening. Tr., p. 57, Ll. 8-11. Corporal 
Bivens went to the scene of the accident where a Jefferson County Sheriffs deputy responsible 
for investigating the crash asked Corporal Bivens to measure and calculate claimant's speed at 
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the time claimant's vehicle left the roadway. Tr., p. 57, L. 22 p. 58, L. 8. Corporal Bivens was 
not asked to investigate claimant's use of alcohol. Tr., p. 60, Ll. 23-25. 
As part of his responsibilities, Corporal Bivens noted that the road was dry and visibility 
was good. Tr., p. 58, Ll. 14-18. Corporal Bivens also noted that the posted speed limit at the 
accident site on Old Bassett Highway was 50 mph. Id. at LI. 22-24. Corporal Bivens testified 
that claimant's truck had been found 796 feet from the edge of the road where it left the 
pavement and that it had been airborne for approximately 48 feet. Tr., p. 62, Ll. 3-11. Using 
scientifically tested and proven math formulas, Corporal Bivens calculated that the truck 
operated by claimant was traveling at 123 mph when it left the roadway. Tr., p. 62, Ll. 18-25. 
Corporal Bivens did not find any pre-collision obstructive or debris on the highway that 
contributed to the crash. Claimant's Ex. 1, p. 4. According to Corporal Bivens' report, the 
highway at the crash location was described as follows: 
At the crash scene location, Bassett Road is a two-Iane/two-way 
road and the general direction of the highway runs from south to 
north. It is bordered on both sides by grass and steep embankments 
that slope down from the road edge. The southbound lane is 
approximately 12.43 feet wide and is separated from the 
northbound lane by a solid/dashed yellow centerline. The line 
prohibits southbound traffic from passing because the road curves. 
The northbound lane is approximately 14.09 feet wide. The road 
does not have paved shoulders and the posted speed limit on this 
section of highway is 50 miles per hour. 
Claimant's Ex. 1, p. 5. Corporal Bivens testified that the yellow center line pavement markings 
were an indicator of an upcoming curve in the road in the direction claimant was driving. Tr., p. 
85, Ll. 14-17. 
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As part of his investigation, Corporal Bivens was asked to go to the hospital to get an 
evidentiary blood sample to determine claimant's blood alcohol content because the investigators 
found two unopened bottles of beer in the debris and the interior of the truck had a "strong odor 
of an alcohol beverage." Tr., p. 61, LI. 6-16; Claimant's Ex. 1, p. 5. Again, a blood test taken at 
the hospital at 4:28 a.m. showed that claimant's alcohol serum was .123. Defendants' Ex 2, p. 
34. Using scientific formulas based upon the results of this serum test defendants' expert 
pharmacologist, Gary Dawson, calculated claimant's forensic BAC of .11 at the time of the 
accident. Deposition of Gary Dawson dated October 19,2012 ("Dawson depo."), p. 10, L. 23-p. 
16, L. 4. Additionally, claimant's urine screen taken at 4:41 a.m. on August 17, 2008 tested 
positive for acetaminophen and opiates, which Dr. Dawson noted indicated that the claimant 
ingested opiates within 12 hours of his screen. Defendants' Ex. 2, p. 14; 
Claimant was familiar with the section of the road where he crashed as he testified in 
deposition that he has driven Old Bassett Highway hundreds of times while speeding. Tr., p. 35, 
LI. 9-17. The claimant also testified that he is a "huge speeder" but that he can "handle it 
because [he] always goes fast." Tr., p. 33, Ll. 4-21; Claimant's depo., p. 20, LI. 7-13. He also 
admitted that he knew that there was a curve in the road where the accident occurred. Tr. p. 35, 
L. 22-p. 36, L. 2. Claimant admitted that driving down Old Bassett Highway at 122 mph was 
"reckless." Tr. p. 40, L. 6. 
Although the claimant alleged for the first time at hearing that he was texting around the 
time of his accident, he had no independent recollection of texting before the accident. Tr., p. 
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50, Ll. 1-4. Claimant testified that he saw his phone after the accident and it showed that he was 
texting around 3 :28 a.m., before the accident. Ir., p. 50, Ll. 6-14. Claimant could not 
corroborate his testimony because he was unable to produce or find his phone. Ir., p. 51, Ll. 17-
19. Ihe claimant's father, Newman Giles, whose employees supposedly found the phone a few 
days after the accident, was asked in deposition two years later to identify the factors causing his 
son's accident based upon his independent investigation of the incident. Ir., p. 96, L. 24-p. 97, 
L. 16. Ihe only causative factor that Newman Giles could identify was speed; he did not 
mention texting as a factor. Ir., p. 98, Ll. 17-21. 
With regard to claimant's last minute texting allegation, the morning after the accident 
Corporal Bivens met with Newman Giles at the accident scene. While there, Newman did not 
mention cell phones nor could Corporal Bivens find any cell phones at the scene after daylight, 
despite looking for them in the wreckage with the Sheriffs deputy. Ir., p. 64, Ll. 13-25; p. 84, 
Ll. 15-19. Later, when Corporal Bivens met Newman Giles at the hospital, Newman did not 
mention claimant's alleged use of his cell phone at the time of the accident. Ir., p. 65, Ll. 4-9. 
According to Corporal Bivens, the only evidence that a cell phone was used at the time of the 
accident was when claimant's passenger, Jonathan Glodo, told Corporal Bivens that he was 
looking down while texting on his cell phone at the time of the accident and did not realize how 
fast claimant was driving. Ir., p. 66, Ll. 9-15. Mr. Glodo, who was wearing his seatbelt at the 
time of the accident, suffered minor injuries as a result of the crash. Claimant's Ex. 1, p. 5. 
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Newman Giles admitted that as his son's employer, his employees (including claimant) 
are not allowed to drink on the job, that drinking and driving are not allowed by his company and 
that his company does not provide alcohol to employees. Tr., p. 101, Ll. 2-4, Ll. 21-25; p. 103, 
Ll. 7-9. 
2. Opinion Testimony of Corporal Bivens 
Corporal Bivens testified that even if he was stone cold sober, he would not want to try to 
negotiate the tum where the accident occurred at 123 mph. Tr., p. 63, Ll. 3-6. He admitted that 
it would not exercise good judgment to even try to do so. Id. at Ll. 7-9. He testified that based 
upon his experience and training, alcohol affects a person's judgment, inhibitions, and motor 
skills. Tr., p. 63. L. 13-p. 64, L. 3. He acknowledged that in his experience as a trooper dealing 
with intoxicated individuals, a person with a .12 BAC is intoxicated with a noticeable 
impairment. Tr., p. 71, Ll. 12-15. Moreover, he testified that a person with a BAC of .08, which 
was .03 lower than claimant's, has a noticeable, obvious impairment. Tr., p. 71, Ll. 18-22. He 
acknowledged that under Idaho law, the legal limit for BAC of an individual 18 years of age 
(such as claimant) was .02. Tr., p. 71, Ll. 10-11; Idaho Code § 18-8004(d). 
In answer to a question posed by claimant's counsel he explained that an experienced 
drinker may not exhibit all the outward signs of intoxication that an inexperienced drinker would 
exhibit. Tr. p., 73, Ll. 20-23. Corporal Bivens opined that alcohol was a contributing factor to 
claimant's crash. Tr., p. 70, Ll. 17-24. However, he could not quantify the percentage that 
alcohol factored in causing the accident. Tr., p. 75, Ll. 11-14. He acknowledged that claimant's 
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speed was a major contributing factor to the crash. Tr., p. 70, Ll. 2-7. In a summary of his 
opinions, he testified that claimant's judgment, specifically how fast he was going under the 
circumstances, was affected by his alcohol consumption: 
Q. And would you agree with me that someone who has been 
drinking, has a blood alcohol content of .12, who's driving at 122 
miles an hour on a road they've driven hundreds of times before, 
and even if they're texting, is exhibiting extremely poor jUdgment? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Would you believe that their judgment is affected by their 
consumption of alcohol? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that would affect how fast they're going and what they're 
doing under the circumstances that they're driving, correct? 
(objections overruled) A. That would be correct. 
Tr., p. 87, L. 15 - p. 88, L. 17. 
3. Testimony and Opinions of Gary Dawson 
Dr. Dawson has a Ph.D. in pharmacology, the study of the effect of drugs and alcohol on 
the human body and performance. Dawson depo., p. 5, Ll. 5-16. He is a licensed pharmacist in 
the State of Idaho and three other states. Id. at p. 5, Ll. 17-19. As a pharmacologist he averages 
fifty (50) hours per year of additional training and education studying extensively about the 
effects of drugs and alcohol on performance and behavior. Id. at p. 6, Ll. 1-16. Dr. Dawson 
frequently testifies as an expert in criminal and civil cases on how drugs or alcohol affect a 
person's operation of motor vehicles. Id. at p. 6, L. 22-p. 7, L. 20. Additionally, Dr. Dawson is 
a POST instructor teaching how drugs and alcohol affects the operation of vessels or motor 
vehicles; he is also a certified Breath Testing Specialist in Idaho. Id. at p. 7, L. 21-p. 8, L. 6. 
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Dr. Dawson calculated claimant's forensic blood alcohol content at the time of the crash. 
He explained that the major difference between medical BAC (alcohol serum in blood drawn 
from the hospital) and forensic BAC (whole blood for DUI) is that the medical BAC is 15% 
higher than forensic BAC. Id., at p. 12, L. 4-p. 13, L. 10. He testified that the claimant's BAC at 
the time of the crash was 11 grams per 100 cc' s of blood or a BAC of .11 which was a third more 
than the per se limit for adults over the age of 21 driving under the influence in Idaho. Id. at p. 
10, L. 23-p. 11, L. 17. Dr. Dawson described the process for determining the forensic BAC 
based upon the blood serum reading of .123 taken from the hospital at 4:28 a.m. which took into 
account the hour delay between the accident and the blood draw as well as the known rate of 
metabolism of between .018 and .02 milligrams percent per hour. Id., at p. 14, Ll. 1-13. Using a 
.02 rate of metabolism he calculated claimant's forensic BAC as .11 at the time of the crash. Id. 
at p. 15, L. 9-p. 16, L. 11. 
Dr. Dawson noted that the claimant's urine screen at the hospital was positive for opiates 
and acetaminophen which indicated that claimant ingested a product with both compounds such 
as Vicodin, Lortab or Norco. Id. at p. 17, L. 7-p. 18, L. 15. Dr. Dawson opined that based upon 
the positive screen, claimant ingested opiates within twelve hours of the screen. Id. at p. 19, Ll. 
9-22. Dr. Dawson testified that the combination of alcohol and opiates are contraindicated --
meaning that patients are warned by their physicians not to take them together because of their 
additive depressant effects on the central nervous system. Id. at p. 20, Ll. 8-20. 
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Dr. Dawson explained how alcohol affects an individual. It included cognitive 
impairment, impairment in judgment and a phenomenon known as "disinhibition." Dr. Dawson 
described disinhibition as someone who may be quiet and shy and becomes the life of the party 
because alcohol removes the "brakes" that keep people behaving reasonably when they are 
sober. Id. at p. 25, L. 5-p. 26, L. 6. He testified that alcohol also impairs a person's decision 
making, causes a psychomotor impairment which includes delays in reaction times, interferes 
with the inability to perform learned tasks and causes divided attention which interferes with 
multitasking. Id. at p. 20, L. 23-p. 22, L. 19. Dr. Dawson testified that it does not take very 
much alcohol to impair cognitive psychomotor function -- an impairment can be caused with a 
BAC as little as .02, but at a BAC of .08 to .10 the impairment becomes quite marked. Id. at p. 
24, Ll. 10-24. 
Dr. Dawson, based upon his review of the evidence of record and his training, opined that 
claimant with a BAC of .11 had an impaired ability to operate his motor vehicle safely because it 
severely impaired his multitasking abilities, cognitive functioning and reaction times. Id. at p. 26, 
Ll. 7-23. He testified that people of a BAC of .11 have a risk of crash or injury that is several 
fold higher than normal. Id. Dr. Dawson opined that, in light of claimant's BAC of .11, the 
claimant was intoxicated. Id. at p. 26, Ll. 24-27. Dr. Dawson noted that the claimant's use of 
narcotics was additive and caused further impairment to the claimant's central nervous system. 
Id. p. 27, Ll. 2-8. He opined that claimant's "blood alcohol content, together with the presence 
of opiates, produced a marked impairment of his ability to operate a motor vehicle in a safe 
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manner. His resultant intoxication was a reasonable and substantial cause of the crash and 
subsequent injury." Id., at p. 27, L. 23-p. 28, L. 2. 
Dr. Dawson also opined that the claimant's alcohol use alone constituted intoxication 
which was a reasonable and substantial cause of his accident and injuries. Id. at p. 29, L. 25-p. 
30, L. 5. Dr. Dawson noted that under Idaho law, the claimant's BAC was five and a halftimes 
the legal limit, a fact which was supported by the testimony of Corporal Bivens. Id. at p. 30, Ll. 
12-21; Tr., 70, Ll. 17-24; see Idaho Code § 18-8004(d). Therefore, using the ratio set forth by 
claimant's expert, Dr. Anderson in his report (Claimant's Ex. 3, p. 1) the claimant's speed was 
actually 2.5 times the speed limit while his intoxication level was 5.5 times the legal BAC limit. 
Dawson depo., p. 31, Ll. 12-21. 
Dr. Dawson also acknowledged that while speed was a factor in the accident, the 
claimant's intoxication arising from his use of alcohol caused impairment which severely limited 
the claimant's ability to multi-task, appreciate the danger posed by his actions on a road he was 
familiar with, and his ability to respond to anything under the circumstances. Id., at p. 28, L. 18-
p. 29, L. 12. He further explained how judgment, cognitive function and decision making, i.e., 
multi-tasking when operating a vehicle are impacted by claimant's intoxication from alcohol. ld., 
at p. 94, L. 19-p. 95, L. 12. 
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..t. The Testimony and Opinions of Dr. Joe Anderson 
Dr. Anderson is an emergency physician, President of Intermountain Emergency 
Physicians and the Chief Medical Officer of Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center. Deposition 
of Joe Anderson dated February 13, 2013, ("Anderson depo."), p. 5, Ll. 2-8. He was asked by 
claimant's counsel (who is Dr. Anderson's corporate attorney) to render an opinion as to the 
factors that caused the claimant's accident. Id. at p. 11, L. 24-p. 12, L. 3. In that regard he 
reviewed the exhibits and understood that the claimant was driving at 123 mph, under the 
influence of alcohol, tested positive for a drug screen for opiates and amphetamines and was 
asked by claimant's counsel whether "alcohol was the single most important factor in causing the 
accident." Id. at p. 13, Ll. 2-16. 
Dr. Anderson, based upon his review of the exhibits and the hearing transcript opined that 
the factors, in descending order, that caused the claimant's accident were his speed, addictive 
personality caused by ADHD, texting while driving and alcohol. Id. at p. 14, Ll. 9-20; p. 16, Ll. 
17 -21. In his report prepared prior to hearing Dr. Anderson did not identifY texting as a factor in 
the crash. Claimant's Ex. 3. Dr. Anderson testified that, in his opinion, the reasonable and 
substantial cause of the claimant's injuries was excessive speed caused by an addictive 
personality. rd. at p. 24, Ll. 14-19. He opined that alcohol did not cause the claimant to drive 
fast. Id. at p. 26, Ll. 1-4. He also opined that a person with a .11 or .12 BAC driving around the 
corner where the accident occurred below the speed limit would be able to negotiate the corner 
while intoxicated, which he claimed supported his opinion. Id. at p. 22, Ll. 17-20. 
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In his initial report, Dr. Anderson opined that the claimant's blood alcohol content was 
onlyl.5 times the legal limit while his speed was nearly 2.5 the posted speed limit, because he 
was trying to develop a sense of proportion using these ratios. Id. at p. 30, Ll. 12-22. He agreed 
that ifhe used .02 BAC as a legal limit for claimant, his ratios would change and the claimant's 
BAC would be 5.5 times the legal limit while his speed was only 2.5 times the posted speed 
limit. Id. at p. 59, L. 16-p. 60, L. 1. Dr. Anderson admitted that the claimant's intoxication 
played a role in the accident as it affected his judgment, impaired his motor skills, his executive 
functioning, his ability to multitask and caused disinhibition. Id. at p. 66, L. 8-p. 67, L. 17. He 
also admitted that that this was the sole occasion where claimant tried to drive 123 mph down the 
Old Bassett Highway and claimant was intoxicated at the time. Id. at p. 78, Ll. 4-11. He further 
admitted that there was no evidence that a person could negotiate the curve where the accident 
occurred with a BAC of .11 or .12 if they were going the speed limit. Id. at p. 80, Ll. 16-25. 
Dr. Anderson opined that no one could testify to a reasonable medical probability that 
alcohol was a reasonable and substantial cause of the injuries that the claimant sustained. 
Claimant's Ex. 3, p. 1. Dr. Anderson based his opinions of what constituted "reasonable and 
substantial cause" upon his understanding that it is defined as "the number one cause. That is the 
main cause. That is a reproducible cause." Id. at p. 52, Ll. 1-6. Yet, he agreed that the claimant 
was intoxicated at the time of the accident. Id. at p. 52, Ll. 14-19. He also acknowledged that at 
the time he drafted his report (June 7, 2012-five days before hearing) he did not mention that 
the claimant was texting because there was no evidence given to him that the claimant was 
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texting. Id. at p. 47, Ll. 7-22. While Dr. Anderson blames the claimant's ADHD for 
contributing to the accident, he did not know if it was under control, did not know the name of 
claimant's treating physician for his ADHD, and did not know the dosage of his medications. 
Id. at p. 49, L. 6-p.5l, L. 10. Dr. Anderson also acknowledged that he did not know the average 
speed the claimant traveled down the Old Bassett Highway or whether the claimant was ever 
involved in a crash prior to this motor vehicle accident. Id. at p. 60, Ll. 5-25. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Are Respondents Employer/Surety entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to LA.R. 
11 and Talbot v. Ames Constr., 127 Idaho 648, 904 P.2d 560 (1995) 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Commission's Finding That The Claimant's Intoxication Was a 
Reasonable and Substantial Cause of His Injuries is Supported by 
Substantial Competent Evidence 
In his Brief~ claimant argues that the Commission's sole factual basis for the application 
of Idaho Code § 72-208 was claimant's blood alcohol content ("BAC") 01'.11. It is an 
undisputed fact that claimant was intoxicated within the meaning of Idaho Code § 72-208(3) at 
the time of his accident. In an attempt to avoid the application ofldaho Code § 72-208, claimant 
relies heavily on the case of Hatley v. Lewiston Grain Growers, Inc., 97 Idaho 719, 552 P.2d 482 
(1976) for the proposition that his intoxication alone does not establish that it was a reasonable 
substantial cause of his injures. However, when examined in light of the current statutory 
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construct, the Hatley case has no precedential value. Rather, as is shown in greater detail below, 
the Commission in this case carefully reviewed the evidence of record, including the opinions of 
each party's expert witnesses and concluded that claimant's admitted intoxication was a 
reasonable and substantial cause of his accident and injuries. Therefore, the Commission 
correctly found that the defendants are not liable for payment of claimant's income benefits by 
virtue of Idaho Code § 72-208. 
In Watson v. Joslin Millwork, Inc., 149 Idaho 850, 243 P.3d 666 (2010), the Supreme 
Court re-emphasized the standards for setting aside an order of the Industrial Commission: 
In fact, this Court may only set aside an order of the Industrial 
Commission on one of the following four grounds: 
(1) The commission's findings of fact are not based on any substantial 
competent evidence; 
(2) The commission has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of its 
powers; 
(3) The findings of fact, order or award were procured by fraud; [or] 
(4) The findings of fact do not as a matter of law support the order or 
award. 
Stoddard v. Hagadone Corp., 147 Idaho 186, 190,207 P.3d 162, 166 (2009) (citing I .C. § 72-
732). 
When the Supreme Court reviews a decision from the Industrial Commission, it reviews 
questions of fact only to determine whether substantial and competent evidence supports the 
Commission's findings. Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 88, 910 P.2d 759, 760 (1996). 
Substantial and competent evidence is "relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept 
to support a conclusion." Boise Orthopedic Clinic v. Idaho State Ins. Fund (In re Wilson), 128 
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Idaho 161, 164, 911 P.2d 754, 757 (1996). The Supreme Court will not disturb the 
Commission's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Excel! Cons/r., Inc. v. State. 
Dept. o/Labor, 141 Idaho 688,692, 116 P.3d 18,22 (2005) (citing Hughen v. Highland Ests., 137 
Idaho 349, 351,48 P.3d 1238, 1240, (2002)). Nor will the Supreme Court re-weigh the evidence or 
consider whether it would have drawn a different conclusion from the evidence presented. Id. The 
Supreme Court will not disturb the Commission's determination as to the weight and credibility of 
evidence unless clearly erroneous. Zapata v. JR. Simplot Co., 132 Idaho 513, 515, 975 P.2d 1178, 
1180 (1999). Finally, all facts and inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to 
Respondents as they prevailed before the Industrial Commission. Garcia v. JR. Simp/ot, 115 
Idaho 966, 968, 772 P.2d 173, 175 (1989). 
l. Idaho Code § 72-208 and Defendants' Liability 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-208(1), the issue decided by the Industrial Commission was 
whether the claimant's admitted intoxication with a BAC of .11 (which is 5.5 times the legal 
limit) was a "reasonable and substantial cause" of claimant's failure to negotiate a tum while 
driving 123 mph on a road he has driven hundreds of times, causing him to roll his truck and 
sustain substantial injuries. Idaho Code § 72-208(2) sets forth the intoxication defense and reads 
in pertinent part that ''[i] if intoxication is a reasonable and substantial cause of an injury, no 
income benefits shall be paid ... " Idaho Code § 72-208(2) (emphasis added). Defendants raised 
Idaho Code § 72-208 as an affirmative defense and they have the burden of proving the 
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intoxication defense by a preponderance of the evidence. See, Seamans v. Maaco Auto Painting 
and Bodyworks, 128 Idaho 747, 752,918 P.2d 1192, 1197 (1996). 
The term "reasonable and substantial cause" is not specifically defined by Idaho Code § 
72-208 or its interpreting case law. Therefore, an examination of the amendment to Idaho Code 
§ 72-208 in 1997 is critical. Prior to its amendment in 1997, Idaho Code § 72-208(2) required a 
showing by defendants that a claimant's intoxication was "the proximate result" of the 
claimant's injuries. Hatley v. Lewiston Grain Growers, Inc., 97 Idaho 719, 721, 552 P.2d 484, 
(1976) (emphasis added). Under Idaho law, proximate cause is defined as "a cause which, in 
natural or probable sequence, produced the complained injury, loss or damage, and but for that 
cause the damage would not have occurred. It need not be the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a 
substantial factor in bringing about the injury, loss or damage. It is not a proximate cause if the 
injury, loss or damage likely would have occurred anyway." IDJI 2.30.1.[2] (emphasis added). 
The Idaho Supreme Court noted there is a difTerence between proximate "but for" 
causation and "substantial factor" causation which is now required by Idaho Code § 72-208(2) 
following its amendment in 1997. In Garcia v. Windley, 144 Idaho 539, 543,164 P.3d 819, 823 
(2007), the Supreme Court stated: 
In Idaho, the "but for" test may be employed when there is a single 
possible cause of the injury; however, the "substantial factor" test 
must be employed when there are multiple possible causes of 
injury, and the jury must be instructed accordingly. Newberry, 142 
Idaho at 288, 127 P .3d at 191. "The "but for" instruction and the 
"substantial factor" instruction are mutually exclusive." Id. 
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(quoting Le 'Gall v. Lewis County, 119 Idaho 182, 187, 923 P .2d 
427,432 (1996) (internal quotations omitted). 
Garcia, 144 Idaho at 543, 164 P.3d at 823 (emphasis added). 
The substantial causation factor test was first enunciated in Fouche v. Chrysler Motors 
Corp., 107 Idaho 701, 692 P.2d 345 (1984). In Fouche-a product liability case-plaintiff sued 
his automobile manufacturer alleging it provided a defective seatbelt and steering column which 
allegedly caused severe injuries after he drove his vehicle into a parked car. The Idaho Court of 
Appeals stated that "the substantial factor" test consists of "whether ... the product defect was a 
substantial factor in causing the injury suffered. The conduct of the manufacturer need not be 
the sale factor. or even the primary factor, in causing the plaintiff's injuries. but merely a 
substantial factor therein." Fouche, 107 Idaho at 704 (emphasis added). Ultimately the court 
reasoned in Fouche that plaintiff could establish the defective safety devices were substantial 
causes of the injuries suffered by plaintiff, based upon the facts of the case, including (1) the 
seatbelt and collapsible steering column were defective; (2) that due to these defects, plaintiff 
struck the steering column with considerable force; (3) that plaintiff suffered a chest injury due 
to the accident; and (4) that plaintiff s chest injury was the type which the safety devices were 
intended to prevent. Fouche, 107 Idaho at 705. 
Additionally, in Fusell v. Sf. Clair, 120 Idaho 591, 818 P.2d 295 (1991), this court 
discussed the difference between the burden of establishing causation where there are multiple 
causes of an injury using substantial factor causation. In Fusell, this court affirmed the trial 
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court's decision to omit any mention of "but for" causation and omit the portion that it is not a 
proximate cause if the damage "likely would have occurred anyways" from the proximate cause 
jury instruction. Id. at 595, 818 P.2d at 299. Following this court's decision in Fusell, the 
Supreme Court made it clear that the use of a "substantial factor" instruction applies in civil 
cases when there are multiple causes of a plaintiff's injuries, even if there is only one potentially 
negligent defendant. Newbeny v. Martens, 142 Idaho 284, 291, 127 P.3d 187, 194 (2005). It is 
clear from these cases that a party's burden of establishing substantial factor causation is less 
than but for proximate causation. 
In the present case, the claimant attempted to avoid the application of Idaho Code § 72-
208 by arguing that due to the claimant's speed alone, his accident would have occurred 
anyways. Then, on the date of hearing, claimant alleged the additional contributing cause of 
texting in support of its argument that Idaho Code § 72-208 did not apply. However, since there 
are admittedly several possible causes of claimant's injuries in light of the circumstances of his 
accident, defendants need not prove that his admitted intoxication was the sole or even primary 
factor in causing his injuries. Fouche, 107 Idaho at 704. As discussed further below, defendants 
only need prove that intoxication was a reasonable substantial cause. 
The 1997 amendment to Idaho Code § 72-208 also supports the conclusion that the 
Legislature intended to reduce a defendants' burden to prove the intoxication defense. Under the 
statute in effect prior to 1997, a defendant had the burden of establishing that the claimant's 
injury was "the proximate result" of their intoxication. Idaho Code § 72-208(2) (1996) 
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(emphasis added). This required a defendant to prove that claimant's intoxication was the 
primary or main cause of their injuries, a difficult burden in most cases which involve multiple 
causes. In 1997, the Legislature clearly lessened defendants' burden under Idaho Code § 72-
208(2) by changing "the proximate result" to "a reasonable and substantial cause" which takes 
into account injuries involving multiple causes where intoxication is not the primary or sole 
cause. 
It is clear that the Legislature's substitution of the term "the proximate result" with the 
term "a reasonable and substantial cause" in Idaho Code § 72-208(2) took into account the fact 
that injuries often occur due to more than one contributing cause. As a result, defendants who 
raise the intoxication defense are no longer required to prove that the accident would have 
occurred "but for" or solely due to claimant's intoxication nor can the claimant argue that the 
accident would have likely occurred without intoxication (which is exactly what claimant's 
expert opined). Rather, defendants' burden herein is lessened because they need only prove that 
the claimant's intoxication was a substantial factor, not the sole or primary factor, in causing 
claimant's injuries. 
Based upon the statute and Idaho law, it is clear that "substantial" does not mean the sole 
or primary cause of the claimant's injuries. The Industrial Commission used the definition 
contained in an online legal dictionary defining "substantial" as "significant or large in having 
substance." R., p. 21 (citing the law dictionary featuring Black's Law Dictionary Free Online 
Legal Dictionary, 2nd ed.) The Kansas Supreme Court, when interpreting a statute similar to 
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Idaho's statute defined the term "substantial" using Black's Law Dictionary as something "[o]f 
real worth and importance ... something worthwhile as distinguished from something without 
value or merely nominal." Poole v. Earp Meat Company, 750 P.2d 1000, 1006 (Kan. 1988) 
(citing Black's Law Dictionary, 280 5th ed. 1979). In Poole, the Kansas Supreme Court was 
asked to decide whether an employee's death resulted "substantially from the employee's 
intoxication." Id. at p. 1003. In Poole, a truck driver was killed when a semi-truck overturned 
while he was returning home. There was no evidence the claimant had been drinking. His truck 
jackknifed and rolled throwing the employee through the windshield killing him instantly. There 
was no evidence that the employee had been driving in an erratic manner and his speed was 
estimated to be approximately 65mph at the time of the accident. An investigating officer found 
beer cans, both full and empty in the cab and around the ground around the truck. The 
employee's blood alcohol content was found to be .13. Poole at p. 1002. 
An administrative law judge denied compensation finding the employee's death was 
substantially caused by his "excessive use of alcohol." Id. at p. 1003. The judge relied on the 
following facts: (l) the employee's BAC of .13; (2) the employee's deliberate ingestion of 
alcohol liquids prior to driving; (3) that as a result of the alcohol consumption the employee's 
driving ability was very substantially impaired including the inability to drive his truck in a safe 
manner and remain fully alert while driving the truck; and (4) as a result of his intoxication the 
employee became inattentive while driving resulting in the truck going out of control and 
wrecking. Id. at p. 1003. 
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The employee's widow appealed arguing that the substantial cause of the employee's 
death is that he fell asleep and that the intoxication defense statute did not apply because her 
husband was so tired he fell asleep. Id. at p. 1005. The Kansas Supreme Court noted that the 
employer's burden under the intoxication statute required proof that the employee's death was 
substantially caused by intoxication, noting that if the employee's "tires had exploded, that 
would have been the substantial cause of his death and it would not matter how intoxicated 
[employee] was at the time." Id. at p. 1005. Thus, there must be some nexus between the 
employee's intoxication and the accident causing injuries. Otherwise, employers would simply 
rely on the fact of intoxication to avoid payment of workers' compensation income benefits. In 
Poole, the Kansas Supreme Court noted that there was a connection between the employee's 
intoxication and his injuries finding that the alcohol content of his blood, coupled with the smell 
of alcohol and empty beer cans at the accident scene was sufficient substantial competent 
evidence to support a finding that the fatal accident was substantially caused by the employee's 
impairment due to his intoxication. Poole, 750 P.2d at pp. 1006-1007. 
Under California's workers' compensation system, employers are required to prove that 
the claimant's injury be "substantially" caused by intoxication. Smith v. Workers' Compensation 
Appeals Bd., 123 Cal. App. 3d 763,176 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1981). In Smith, the claimant's husband 
was killed in a car accident returning from a job site with a BAC of .25. A forensic pathologist 
testified that the employee's judgment reaction time would have been impaired seriously at that 
blood alcohol level, which the California Court of Appeals found was sufficient evidence to 
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support the board's finding that the employee's death was caused substantially by intoxication 
despite evidence that the weather was bad, the road was bad and the employee had appeared 
sober and coordinated to his coworkers. Smith, 123 Cal. App. 3d at p. 774. 
2. Claimant's Admitted Intoxication Was a Reasonable and Substantial Cause of His 
Injuries 
In reaching its finding that defendants met their burden of proving that the claimant's 
intoxication was a reasonable and substantial cause of claimant's injuries, it relied on the 
credible evidence of record and the expert opinions of Corporal Bivens, Dr. Dawson and Dr. 
Anderson. All experts testified that the claimant was intoxicated (impaired due to alcohol) at the 
time of his crash due to his use of alcohol. Intoxication under the statute means "being under the 
influence of alcohol or of controlled substances ... " Idaho Code § 72-208(3). The factors that 
support this finding include the "strong odor of alcohol" in his wrecked truck detected by 
Corporal Bivens when he arrived at the accident scene, the claimant's BAC of .11 at the time of 
his crash and the discovery of unopened beer bottles in the debris and interior of the truck. It is 
also undisputed, that based upon his forensic BAC of .11 and his age at the time of the accident 
(eighteen), the claimant's BAC was 5.5 times the legal limit of 0.2. See, Idaho Code § 18-
8004(d). 
The Commission then considered the opinions of the experts in this case. While Corporal 
Bivens opined that speed was a "major contributing factor" in causing claimant's accident, he 
also concluded that the claimant's alcohol consumption was a contributing factor as well. R., p. 
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21. The Commission considered Corporal Bivens' opinion that alcohol affects an individual's 
judgment, inhibitions and the ability to safely control a motor vehicle. R., p. 21. The 
Commissions also considered Corporal Bivens' opinions that a person with a BAC of .12 driving 
122 mph on a road they had driven hundreds of times before even while texting, exhibits 
extremely poor judgment and that judgment would be affected by their consumption of alcohol, 
including judgment relating to speed. Tr., p. 87, L. II-p. 88, L. 17; R., pp. 21-22. Similarly, Dr. 
Dawson opined that the claimant's intoxication was a reasonable and substantial cause of his 
crash and subsequent injury, which the Commission relied upon in reaching the same conclusion. 
R., p. 23. Dr. Dawson testified the claimant's intoxication due to his consumption of alcohol 
alone was a substantial cause of his injuries because his act of driving while under the influence 
of alcohol significantly impaired his judgment, inhibition, ability to multitask (drive safely and 
text) and his ability to understand upcoming risks, including the curve in the road while driving. 
Dawson depo., p. 29, L. 25-p. 30, L. 5. Even claimant's own expert, Dr. Anderson, agreed that 
claimant's use of alcohol impaired him in this manner. Anderson depo., p. 66, L. 8-p. 67, L. 17. 
Further exacerbating the effects of his alcohol induced intoxication was claimant's use of 
opiates less than twelve hours prior to his accident as documented in his drug screen. Dr. 
Dawson noted that opiates had and addictive affect causing additional impairment. Dawson 
depo., p. 27, Ll. 2-8. Claimant argued that the Commission improperly considered his use of 
prescription pain medication and Adderall in determining that he was intoxicated. Idaho Code § 
72-208(3) defines intoxication as 
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"being under the influence of alcohol or of controlled substances, 
as defined in section 37-2701(e) Idaho Code. Provided, however, 
that this definition shall not include an employee's use of a 
controlled substance for which a prescription has been issued 
authorizing such substance to be dispensed to the employee, or 
when such substances dispensed directly by a physician to the 
employee where the employee's use of the controlled substance is 
in accordance with the instructions for use of the controlled 
substance. 
Idaho Code § 72-208(3) (2008) (emphasis added). In this case, claimant's use of Lithium and 
opiates were not in accordance with instructions for their use because alcohol and opiates are 
contraindicated, meaning that patients are warned by their physicians not to take them together 
because of their additive impairing effect on the central nervous system. Dawson depo., p. 20. 
Ll. 8-20. Therefore, the Commission properly considered the claimant's use of opiates less than 
twelve hours prior to his crash, his admitted intoxication from alcohol and the claimant's 
intoxication resulting solely from his ingestion of alcohol. R., p. 23, fn 8. 
Dr. Dawson's opmlOns are supported by substantial and competent evidence and are 
more persuasive than Dr. Anderson's opinions. First, claimant admitted that he has driven the 
Old Bassett Road where the accident occurred hundreds of times prior to his accident and despite 
his propensity to speed, he has never been involved in an accident on any roadway. Thus, his 
propensity to speed was a factor-but was not the sole cause of his accident-otherwise he 
would have crashed on this road hundreds of times. Since the claimant was driving two and a 
half times over the posted speed limit at the time he failed to negotiate the curve despite his 
ability to negotiate the curve hundreds of times before, the evidence establishes that his 
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acknowledged intoxication caused his admittedly reckless behavior on the night of his accident. 
This supports the Commissions' finding that claimant was experiencing impairment due to 
intoxication. R., p. 28. This evidence also establishes that claimant's intoxication was a 
reasonable and substantial factor in causing his accident and injuries. 
The Commission properly determined that Dr. Anderson's opinions were less persuasive 
than Dr. Dawson's opinions. He opined that the reasonable and substantial cause of the 
claimant's injuries was excessive speed caused by an addictive personality due to his ADHD. 
Anderson depo., p. 25; R., p. 26. However, Dr. Anderson defined "substantial and reasonable 
cause as the main number one cause ... the main cause ... the reproducible cause." Anderson 
depo., p. 52; R., p. 26. He could not also explain why, if alcohol was not a substantial factor in 
the accident, claimant did not crash on the hundreds of times he has driven this stretch; nor did 
he know whether the claimant's ADHD was medically controlled at the time of the accident. R., 
p. 27. The Commission then noted that Dr. Anderson acknowledged that the claimant's alcohol 
was a factor in causing his injuries and that the only time the claimant attempted to negotiate the 
curve on the Old Bassett Highway at 123 mph he was intoxicated through his use of alcohol. R., 
pp. 26-27; Anderson depo. at 52 Ll. 1-6. The Commission, based upon the facts of record, its 
reliance upon the opinions of Dr. Dawson and Corporal Bivens, and its criticism of Dr. 
Anderson's opinions, applied Idaho Code § 72-208(2) and denied the claimant's income benefits. 
There is a strong public policy supporting the Commission's decision based upon the 
facts of record. Idaho law sets forth a strong policy rationale for not permitting a claimant to 
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benefit from his intoxication because the employee is not allowed to point to another one of 
reckless behaviors, i.e., speeding, (or allegedly texting) as the sole "substantial" cause of his 
accident to prohibit the application of the intoxication defense. In Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho, 
466, 716 P.2d 1238 (1986), this court stated that "It is clearly unsound to afford immunity to a 
negligent defendant because the intervening force, the very anticipation of which made his 
conduct negligent, has brought about the expected harm." Id. (quoting Gibson v. United States, 
457 F.2d 1391,1395 (3 rd Cir. 1972). The same public policy argument applies to the claimant in 
this case. The claimant's inability to negotiate a turn while driving 122 mph while he was 
intoxicated was an anticipated result of his significantly impaired judgment, cognitive and 
executive function caused by his ingestion of alcohol. Accordingly claimant cannot rely solely 
on his propensity to speed (or alleged texting) as grounds to circumvent the application of the 
intoxication defense set forth by the Legislature in Idaho Code § 72-208(2). 
If claimant prevails on his assertion that his intoxication was not a reasonable and 
substantial cause of his injuries because he was excessively speeding, allegedly texting and not 
wearing a seatbelt when the accident occurred, then the intoxication defense has no practical 
application. To avoid the application of Idaho Code § 72-208(2), intoxicated claimants 
throughout the state would simply be able to assert that their injuries were caused by the events 
immediately preceding the accident, such as swerving into traffic while attempting to pass a 
slower vehicle because the claimant had a propensity to pass cars. The Idaho Legislature's 
1997 amendments to Idaho Code § 72-208 and Idaho Code § 72-228 (removing the statutory 
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presumption that intoxication did not cause injuries in cases of death or where claimant cannot 
testify) demonstrate the intent to lessen the barriers to the application of the intoxication defense. 
It also indicates that the Legislature did not want intoxicated individuals to benefit from causing 
their own injuries. 
3. The Cases Relied Upon by Claimant are Distinguishable and Have no 
Precedential Value 
Claimant relies heavily on the case of Hatley v. Lewiston Grain Growers, Inc., 97 Idaho 
719, 552 P2d. 482 (1976) for the proposition that his BAC of .11 alone does not establish that it 
was a reasonable and substantial cause of his injuries. However, the Hatley case is 
distinguishable from the present case on several grounds. First, in Hatley, Idaho Code § 72-208 
required the employer to prove that claimant's injuries were "the proximate result" of his 
intoxication rather than "a reasonable and substantial cause" under the current statute. Hatley, 97 
Idaho at 723, fn 1. Therefore in Hatley the employer was required to prove "proximate cause," a 
higher burden on the defendant. Hatley, 97 Idaho at 722. Second, in Hatley, the defendants had 
to overcome a rebuttable presumption that claimant's death was not caused by his intoxication. 
Idaho Code § 72-228 (1976). Id. Third, in the present case there is substantial evidence 
establishing that the Claimant's accident was caused by his intoxication beyond that produced in 
Hatley. 
At the time of the claimant's accident in Hatley, Idaho Code § 72-208(2) read: 
if an injury is the proximate result of an employee's intoxication, 
all income benefits shall be reduced by fifty per cent (50%), 
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provided that such reduction shall not apply where the intoxicants 
causing the employees intoxication were furnished by the 
employer or where the employer permits the employee to remain at 
work with knowledge by the employer or a supervising agent that 
the employee is intoxicated. 
Hatley, 97 Idaho at p. 723, fn 1. (emphasis added). This statute required that defendants prove 
the intoxication defense by proximate "but for" causation or that it was the sole cause which is 
no longer required by Idaho Code § 72-708(2). Prior to the amendment of Idaho Code § 72-
208(2)'s amendment in 1997, the statute required a showing by defendants that the claimant's 
intoxication was a "the proximate cause" of the claimant's injury. Hatley, 97 Idaho at 722. 
(emphasis added). The current statute requires proof that the claimant's intoxication be "a 
reasonable and substantial cause" of the injuries. As previously noted, under Idaho law there is a 
significant difference between the burden required for proving proximate "but for" causation and 
"substantial factor" causation now required by Idaho Code § 72-208(2). In an effort to avoid the 
application of Idaho Code § 72-208, claimant alleged several potential causes of his accident, 
among them his intoxication. Defendants need only prove that his admitted intoxication was a 
substantial factor in causing his injuries, not that his injuries likely would have occurred even if 
he were not intoxicated or that it was the primary cause of his injuries, as was the case in Hatley. 
Additionally, the burden of establishing the intoxication defense upon the defendants in 
Hatley was much greater than in the current case because the defendants in Hatley had to 
overcome the rebuttable presumption set forth in Idaho Code § 72-228 as it existed in 1976. At 
the time of the decision in Hatley, Idaho Code § 72-228 provided a presumption in cases 
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involving an employee's death or where the claimant could not testify that that the injury or 
death was not occasioned by the employee's intoxication. Hatley, 97 Idaho at 722. However, the 
current version (which was amended in 1997 at the same time as Idaho Code § 72-208) 
specifically excludes the presumption in cases where defendants raise the intoxication defense 
under 72-208. Idaho Code § 72-228(2). In Hatley the defendants could not overcome the pre-
1997 amendment presumption set forth in Idaho Code § 72-228. Moreover, the amendment of 
Idaho Code § 72-228 to specifically exclude the applicability of the presumption in cases 
involving an employee's intoxication indicates the Legislature's intent to reduce defendants' 
burden of proving the intoxication defense. This amendment coincides with the amendment of 
Idaho Code § 72-208(2) (which lessened the defendant's causation burden) demonstrating the 
Legislature's intent to reduce a defendant's burden to prove the intoxication defense under 
Idaho's workers' compensation laws. 
Finally, as opposed to the defendants in Hatley, here defendants provided sufficient proof 
that the claimant's admitted intoxication was a reasonable and substantial cause of his accident. 
In Hatley the defendants relied solely on the fact that the claimant had a BAC of .11 at the time 
of the accident. In Hatley, as opposed to this case, there was testimony that prior to his accident 
the claimant was not drunk and did not seem intoxicated to people who saw him. Hatley, 97 
Idaho at p. 721. Additionally, there was evidence that the curve where the accident occurred had 
caused several previous accidents, including one where a semi-truck had failed to negotiate the 
curve one year prior to the accident. Id. 
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In the present case, claimant was admittedly intoxicated, he had driven the road where the 
accident occurred hundreds of times prior to this accident without incident despite his propensity 
to speed, he had never been involved in an accident prior to his August 2008 crash, he was 
driving two and a half times over the speed limit at the time he failed to negotiate the curve 
despite the fact that he was able to negotiate that curve hundreds of times before while 
presumably driving over the speed limit as was his habit, and he admitted that his actions on the 
night of the accident were reckless. Thus defendants produced significant evidence that 
claimant's intoxication was a substantial cause of his injuries. 
Moreover, in Hatley, the Supreme Court specifically limited its holding in the case 
stating "we only hold that the blood alcohol level of .117% in this case is not sufficiently high to 
overcome the statutory presumption against causation." Hatley, 97 Idaho at 722. (emphasis 
added). It is clear that this statutory presumption no longer applies to cases involving an 
employee's admitted intoxication. Idaho Code § 72-228(2). Therefore, Hatley is not dispositive 
and does not control the present case before the Commission. 
Claimant's reliance on Folse v. American Well Control is also misplaced and of no 
precedential value. In his Brief, claimant argues that Folse, 536 So.2d 686 (La. App. 3 Cir. 
1988), is even more analogous to his case than Hatley. Appellant's Brief, pp. 33-37. Claimant 
extensively argues that the decedent in Folse had traveled the same road numerous times before 
and was an experienced drinker, thereby proving that defendants herein failed to meet their 
burden under Idaho Code § 72-208. However, claimant's argument is misplaced. 
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The Folse court, in large part, reached its decision because it could not determine whether 
the decedent was actually intoxicated. Folse, 536 So.2d at p. 692. In the present case, however, 
it is undisputed that claimant was intoxicated. In determining whether intoxication was a 
substantial factor in causing the accident, the Folse court correctly noted that there must be some 
evidence other than the happening of the accident, such as behavior that would demonstrate "the 
employee's intoxication and resulting impairment or loss of control." Folse, 536 So.2d at 690. 
"Such behavior could include slurring of speech, drowsiness, staggering, and erratic driving prior 
to the accident." Id. (emphasis added). Significantly, there was no evidence of erratic driving in 
Folse (a fact ignored by claimant in his Brief): 
The investigating officer inspected the roadway for a distance of 
about six-tenths of a mile back from the scene of the accident and 
found no evidence of irregular driving on the part ofMr. Folse. 
Folse, 536 So.2d at 691. In the present case, claimant drove off the road at 123 mph, which 
claimant admitted was reckless. 
Aside from the fact that the legal standard employed by the Louisiana Court was 
significantly different than Idaho's and that the Folse court determined that the decedent in that 
case was not intoxicated for the purpose of Louisiana's statute, claimant ignores the salient fact 
that he unlike Folse, who was driving normally - was driving at 123 miles per hour at the time 
of the accident. This is perhaps the epitome of "irregular driving." Moreover, claimant admitted 
he was driving recklessly. 
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Claimant attempts to get around this obvious problem by claiming that he was "texting on 
a comer while speeding" and "texting on a comer while going 123 miles per hour." Claimant's 
Brief at pp. 36-37. However, claimant's assertion that he was texting at the time of the accident 
and texting on a comer is blatant speculation and should be disregarded as such- there is no 
evidence whatsoever in or out of the record that claimant was texting at the time of the accident 
or while he was going around a curve. I 
B. The Commission's Determination That Claimant's Alleged Texting Would 
Not be Considered is Supported by Substantial and Competent Evidence 
1. The Commission Has Discretion to Refuse to Consider Evidence that is 
Unreliable, Improbable, Not Credible, or Has Little Probative Value 
The Commission has the discretion to refuse to consider evidence - such as claimant's 
last-minute evidence oftexting that is unreliable, improbable or has little probative value. 
Under the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act, the Commission 
may exclude evidence that is irrelevant, unduly repetitious, or 
excludable on constitutional or statutory grounds, or on the basis of 
any evidentiary privilege provided by statute or recognized in the 
courts of Idaho. IDAPA 09.01.06.026.13; Idaho Code § 67-5251. 
The Commission is not, however, bound by the Idaho Rules 
of Evidence. Stolle v. Bennett, 144 Idaho 44, 49-50, 156 P.3d 545, 
550-51 (2007). The Commission has the discretionary power to 
consider any type of reliable evidence having probative value, even 
if that evidence is not admissible in a court of law. Id. at 50, 156 
P.3d at 551. The Commission has the discretion to 
admit evidence if "it is a type commonly relied upon by prudent 
I See Section B. infra. Claimant had no recollection oftexting; the investigating officer did not tind a cell phone at the scene of 
the accident; claimant's father -who allegedly found the phone and for the first time at the hearing claimed he saw texts had been 
sent and or received (at some undetermined time before the accident)--did not keep the phone; Claimant's father did not 
mention the alleged texting during deposition: and Claimant's expert did not address texting as a cause of the accident in his 
report. prepared five days before the hearing. 
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persons in the conduct of their affairs." Id.; I.C. § 67-5251. This 
does not mean, however, that the Commission is required to admit 
such evidence. 
Higgins v. Larry Miller Subaru-Mitsubishi, 145 Idaho 1,5 175 P.3d 163, 167, (2007). 
The credibility of witnesses and evidence is a matter within the province of the Industrial 
Commission. Zapata v. JR. Simplof Co., 132 Idaho 513, 515, 975 P.2d 1178, 1180 (1999). 
Conclusions reached by the Commission as to the credibility and weight of evidence will not be 
disturbed unless the conclusions are clearly erroneous. Id., Hughen v. Highland Estates. 137 
Idaho 349, 351,48 P.3d 1238,1240 (2002). On appeal, this court does not re-weigh the evidence 
or consider whether it would have reached a different conclusion from the evidence presented. 
See. Warden v. Idaho Timber Corp., 132 Idaho 454, 457, 974 P.2d 506, 509 (1999). 
A referee need not accept as true testimony of a witness when the testimony IS 
"inherently improbable, or rendered so by facts and circumstances disclosed at the hearing or 
tria1." Pierstor.ffv. Gray's Auto Shop, 58 Idaho 438,447,74 P.2d 171,175 (1937). Mazzone v. 
Texas Roadhouse, Inc., 154 Idaho 750, 754, 302 P.3d 718, 726 (2013). On appeal, this court 
must view all facts and inferences "in the light most favorable to the party who prevailed before 
the Commission." Taylor v. Soran Rest., Inc .. 131 Idaho 525, 527,960 P.2d 1254, 1256 (1998) 
(internal quotations and citation omitted). 
Here, the Commission had considerable latitude whether to consider or give weight to 
claimant's improbable claim that he was texting. The Commission acted within its discretion 
when it determined that Claimant's last-minute and uncorroborated "evidence" of texting would 
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not be considered. The facts and circumstances disclosed (for the first time) at the hearing 
concerning the alleged texting render it highly improbable. 
2. Claimants' Argument that He was Texting at the Time of the Accident is 
Disingenuous. Does Not Reflect the Testimony. and is Speculative. 
At various times, claimant argues in his brief that he was texting at the time of the crash: 
• "Evidence in the record suggests that Kal was texting at the time he crashed." 
Claimant's Brief, 3 (emphasis added). 
• "Kal was sending text message to Ryan at approximately the same time the 
car accident happened (3:30 a.m.)." Claimant's Brief, 7 (emphasis added). 
• Newman's testimony" .... corroborates Kal' s testimony regarding Kal's texting at 
the time of the accident." Claimant's Brief, 23 (emphasis added). 
• "[Newman's] ... testimony regarding Kal's cell phone usage at the time of the 
accident is an admission by the opposing party." Claimant's Brief, 24 (emphasis 
added). 
• "* Kal's texting while driving at time of the accident." Claimant's Briet~ 32 
(emphasis added). 
• "However, there is no evidence that Kal, prior to the accident, had ever traveled 
down the Old Bassett Highway at night, or while texting .. ... : Claimant's Brief, 
36 (emphasis added). 
• "( ... texting on a corner while speeding is the cause of Kal's accident}." 
Claimant's Brief, 36 (emphasis added). 
• " ... including the facts that he was texting on a corner while going 123 miles 
per hour .... " Claimant's Brief, 37 (emphasis added). 
• " ... the Commission erred in refusing to consider evidence that Kal was texting 
at the time of the accident; ... ". Claimant's Brief, 46 (emphasis added). 
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Contrary to claimant's various assertions, there is no evidence that claimant was texting 
at the time of the accident; there is no evidence that he "was texting on a comer." At most, if the 
testimony is to be believed, is there may have been some texts to and/or from claimant's cell 
phone at some unknown point prior to the accident. Claimant is simply presenting argument as 
fact. In fact, claimant testified that he had no independent recollection of texting before the 
accident. Tr., p. 50, Ll. 1-4. There is no evidence in the record as to the exact time the accident 
actually occurred nor is there testimony or other evidence of the time(s) that claimant was 
allegedly texting. 
3. Evidence of Claimant 's Alleged Texting is Improbable and Unreliable. 
Numerous facts disclosed at the hearing support the improbability and unreliability of 
claimant's last-minute assertion that he was texting: 
• Claimant had no independent recollection oftexting at the time of the accident. Tr., p. 50, 
Ll. 1-4. 
• The issue of the alleged texting was never raised - not even once - before the hearing. 
Tr., p. 40, Ll. 7-11; Tr., p. 99, Ll. 16-21. 
• Corporal Bivens never found the cell phone despite his thorough search immediately after 
the accident. Tr., p. 64, Ll. 13-25; p. 84, L1.15-19. 
• Neither claimant nor his father ever notified the police or the defendant that a cell phone 
had been found. Tr., p. 41, Ll. 11-14; Tr., p. 66, Ll. 4-7. 
• Claimant could not produce his phone. Tr., p. 51, Ll. 17-19. 
• Claimant never mentioned the alleged texting during his deposition or in answer to 
interrogatories. Tr., p. 54, Ll. 10-24. 
- 36 -
• Claimant's father never mentioned the alleged texting during his deposition and cited 
speeding as the cause (not texting), despite being asked what his investigation showed 
caused the accident Tr., p. 96, L. 24 - p. 97, L 16.; p. 98, Ll. 17-21. 
• Claimant never asked the friend he was allegedly texting ifhe still had his phone to verify 
the texting. Tr., p. 52, Ll. 1-8. 
• Claimant's expert Dr. Joe Anderson (who's own son was involved in a serious car 
accident caused by texting) NEVER cited texting as a cause of the accident in his report, 
which was dated a mere five days before the hearing. Claimant's Ex. 3; Anderson depo., 
p. 47, Ll. 7-22. 
The claimant's alleged texting was never disclosed until the hearing, even to claimant's 
own expert who prepared a report five days before hearing. The facts outlined above highlight 
the improbability and unreliability of claimant's "texting evidence." Combined with the fact that 
the most that claimant could show was that that texting occurred at some point prior to the 
accident, the Commission was correct and within its authority as finder of fact in determining 
that the uncorroborated evidence regarding texting would not be considered, and that the clearest 
explanation for the claimant's driving off the road and rolling his truck at 123 miles per hour was 
that "he was experiencing impairment due to intoxication." R., p. 28. 
4. The Alleged Texting Was Not an ., Undisputed Fact" 
Claimant's argument that his alleged texting is an "undisputed fact" because his father is 
his employer ignores the fact that Newman Giles is claimant's father, and thus was essentially in 
the position of a hostile witness. Moreover, admissions by a party opponent relate to whether out 
of court statements are considered hearsay not whether such statements must be considered 
true. Newman's testimony was impeached on cross examination, thus he is not credible. The 
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Commission determined, for the reasons discussed above, that the so-called texting evidence was 
improbable and unreliable. 
5. Any Refusal to Consider Evidence ofTexting was Harmless Error 
It is undisputed that claimant had a BAC of .11 at the time of the accident. Claimant 
concedes that someone talking on their cell phone - much less texting - "while driving is the 
equivalent of someone driving with a BAC of .08." Claimant's Brief at 24, citing Mr. Dawson's 
deposition. Therefore, texting at most was additive and his intoxication alone from a .11 BAC 
was sufficient to cause his reckless driving. As such, even if the Commission found that 
claimant was texting at the time he rolled the vehicle at 123 miles per hour, his intoxication level 
would have been the equivalent of a .19 BAC. Under these circumstances, a finding that 
intoxication was a reasonable and substantial cause of the accident was within the Commission's 
role as finder of fact. 
C. The Commission's Finding That Claimant's Injuries Were Caused by The 
Accident - Rather Than Claimant's Failure to Wear a Seatbelt - is 
Supported by Substantial and Competent Evidence 
In his Brief, the Claimant argues-without citing any supporting authority-that his 
injuries were caused by his failure to wear a seatbelt, rather than his 123 mile per hour rollover 
accident, while he was legally intoxicated at 5.5 times the legal limit. This argument is without 
merit. Just as a defendant cannot argue that a plaintiff's damages should be reduced for failure to 
wear a seatbelt, a claimant should not be able to force a defendant to prove what injuries would 
have occurred had a seatbelt been worn. See Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 727 P.2d 1187 
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(Idaho 1986); see also Hansen v. Howard 0. Miller. Inc .. 93 Idaho 314,460 P.2d 739 (1969) 
("the fact that a plaintiff was not using his seat belt at the time of the accident is not admissible 
as evidence that he was contributorily negligent"). Id. at 317, 460 P.2d at 742. As the Hansen 
Court stated, "The reason for this rule is the lack of connection between failure to wear a seat 
belt and the occurrence of the accident." Id. at 318, 460 P.2d at 743. 
Here, there is no connection between claimant's failure to wear a seatbelt and the 
occurrence of the accident which resulted in his injuries. The accident did not occur because he 
was not wearing a seat belt, it occurred as the referee determined - because claimant was 
intoxicated, was impaired as a result of that intoxication, and was driving recklessly at 123 miles 
per hour. 
D. Respondents Employer/Surety Are Entitled to Attorney Fees Pursuant to 
I.A.R 11 and Talbot v. Ames Constr., 127 Idaho 648, 904 P.2d 560 (1995) 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 11.1, a party may be subject to sanctions if an appeal is 
brought frivolously and without foundation. "Under IAR Rule 11.1, sanctions will be awarded on 
appeal if the party requesting them proves: (1) the other party's arguments are not well grounded 
in fact, warranted by existing law, or made in good faith, and (2) the claims were brought for an 
improper purpose, such as unnecessary delay or increase in the costs of litigation." Frank v. 
Bunker Hill Co .. 142 Idaho 126, 124 P.3d 1002, 1008 (2005). In Talbot v. Ames Constr., 127 
Idaho 648, 904 P.2d 560 (1995), this court held that all the claimant's attorney asked the court to 
do on appeal was re-weigh the evidence and reach a different conclusion than that reached by the 
Commission and awarded attorney fees on appeal against the claimant's counsel. 
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As was the case in Talbot, all that the claimant asked this court to do is re-weigh the 
evidence and enter a new conclusion favorable to him. Claimant's argument that intoxication 
was somehow not a reasonable and substantial cause of his injuries-while claimant's BAC was 
5.5 times the legal limit and he was driving at 123 miles per hour-is clearly contrary to the 
applicable statues and the substantial factor test that must be employed when there are multiple 
possible causes of an accident. In fact, claimant devotes almost his entire brief arguing that the 
court should employ an outdated standard, arguing the facts, and asking this court to re-weigh 
the evidence. As such, Defendants herein are entitled to attorney fees. 
CONCLUSION 
This court should affirm the Commission's finding that defendants' proved by substantial 
and competent evidence that claimant's intoxication was a reasonable and substantial cause of 
his injuries such that income benefits are barred by Idaho Code § 72-208. For the above 
reasons, the Order of the Commission should be affirmed. 
i~r. 
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